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What influences the decisions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return
home after prolonged displacement? This article investigates the attitudes of
victims of forced migration by analysing survey data on Kurdish displaced
persons and returnees in Turkey. In an attempt to give a voice to displaced
persons, we survey the conditions under which IDPs return home despite
continuing tensions, lack of infrastructure and risk of renewed violence. The
findings suggest that integration into a new environment in Western Turkey,
measured by economic advancement and knowledge of Turkish, reduces the
likelihood of return. Yet contrary to conventional wisdom, more educated
IDPs demonstrate a stronger desire to return to their ancestral communities,
suggesting that education increases available options for displaced persons. The
findings are relevant in informing global responses to forced migration as well
as understanding the local experiences and perceptions of IDPs in conflict-
ridden societies.
Keywords: forced migration, Kurds, social capital, education, Turkey
Introduction
Forced migration is an issue of inquiry across multiple disciplines, yet little
systematic effort has been made to collect data on returnees’ intentions or the
actual returns in post-conflict zones (for exceptions, see Black and Koser
1999; Dahlman and O´ Tuathail 2005; O’Loughlin et al. 2011). While aca-
demic studies indicate it is extremely difficult to reverse conflict-induced
displacements (Lustick 1993; McGarry 1998; Carmichael 2002), voluntary
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repatriation remains a key priority for international organizations such as
UNHCR (2013).1 By focusing on a central question in refugee studies—
why and how do some displaced manage to return home—this article aims
to inform regional and global approaches to forced migration. The Kurdish
experience on displacement and voluntary return in Turkey is particularly
interesting given the variation in experience, especially the decisions of
minority Kurds to return home under conditions that seem prohibitive,
including the absence of political settlement in the country.
Academic work on refugee studies and related policymaking frequently
lack reliable data, largely because relevant surveys are still relatively rare
(Jacobsen and Landau 2003; Bloch 2007). As a result, international organ-
izations, governments and NGOs are often forced to make decisions without
consulting vulnerable groups most likely to be affected (O´ Tuathail 2010:
262). This article aims to help fill this gap in the literature by analysing
survey data collected among victims of displacement (i.e. displaced persons).
So far, there has been mixed and contradictory evidence in the literature as to
whether return is feasible following protracted displacements,2 or, in some
cases, if it is even desirable (Warner 1994; Zetter 1999; Adelman and Barkan
2011).3 To shed light on return under prohibitive conditions, this article
focuses on two groups of Kurdish Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs):
those who remain displaced and have resided in urban environments in
Western parts of Turkey since the 1990s; and those who have opted to
return to their pre-conflict homes and communities despite continuing low-
intensity violence. By doing so, we hope to contribute to an emerging area of
research aiming to give a voice to victims of displacement by using surveys
with large numbers of respondents.
The existing literature points to several reasons why refugees and displaced
persons will either return home or integrate into a new environment. Previous
studies focusing on displaced persons and refugees in Bosnia (Dahlman and
O´ Tuathail 2005; Sert 2008), the South Caucasus (Toal and Grono 2011),
Kazakhstan (Kus c¸u 2014), Colombia (Iba´nez and Moya 2010) and Turkey
itself (Ayata and Yu¨kseker 2005; C¸elik 2005b; Kurban et al. 2006) have
identified specific factors which victims of displacement prioritize, including
economic opportunities, security provisions or prospects of residing among
co-ethnics.
Voluntary peaceful return following displacement remains a critically
important area in refugee studies.4 The existing literature has pointed to
several reasons why refugees and displaced persons will opt to return home
or integrate into a new environment. For one thing, living conditions in the
new environment in displacement matter. Victims of displacement could be
temporarily accommodated in designated refugee camps and face unbearable
restrictions, or they could be integrated within a new environment in mixed
neighbourhoods in major metropolitan centres; such alternative options
might well influence the intentions to return home (Black 2001; O´ Tuathail
2010; Bas er and C¸elik 2014). In addition, the ethnopolitical make-up of the
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neighbourhoods of pre-conflict residence, particularly majority/minority pat-
terns, could influence the extent to which victims of displacement opt to
return or integrate into a new post-war environment (Celik 2005a; Toal
and Dahlman 2005; Belloni 2006; Sert 2008).
By examining the claims in the literature and highlighting the demographic
profile of Kurdish returnees (e.g. age and gender), their needs, and institu-
tional support mechanisms, we aim to assist scholars and practitioners to
understand how the actions of governments, ethnic minority parties, NGOs
and international organizations could boost the success rate of voluntary
returnees elsewhere.
Main Hypotheses on Return
We examine alternative explanations of return based on a survey of 370
Kurdish returnees and non-returnees. The survey investigated economic,
psychological and socio-political factors of forced migration in Turkey; it
was drawn from the existing literature and included novel hypotheses on
the role of social capital. We use the survey data to consider how these
factors affect the intentions and actual outcomes of return. More specifically,
we test the following set of hypotheses, as summarized in Figure 1.
The integration hypothesis argues that displaced persons are less likely to
return home after the passage of time and after successfully settling in a new
environment when such an option exists in the first place (see also Zolberg
1989: 406; Zetter 1999; ICG 2002; Iba´nez and Moya 2010). There could be
several related indicators of integration, including a permanent job, property,
and language proficiency (Wahlbeck 1999; Annan et al. 2011; Toal and
Grono 2011). If this hypothesis is correct, displaced people with permanent
jobs, good knowledge of the majority language and high education levels will
be less likely to return.
An alternative hypothesis focuses on pre-conflict memories. Several studies
indicate the desire to return to pre-conflict homes tends to be strongest for
those refugees who spent their formative years there. As Jansen (2009: 55)
observes in his ethnography of returns in Bosnia, elderly refugees are ‘dying
to return and returning to die.’ Refugees who are too young to remember
much of the pre-displacement life are generally less committed to return, and
the generation born after the forced migration may not even associate ‘home’
with the pre-displacement region (Hammond 1999: 236–240; Romano 2005;
Loizos 2009: 71–73). Following this logic, the sense of home hypothesis argues
that older displaced people, with positive memories of the pre-displacement
life, will be more likely to return than the young or those with negative
memories. If this thesis is correct, advanced age and positive memories of
pre-displacement homes will improve the odds of return (see also Ayata and
Yu¨kseker 2005: 36).
The community effort hypothesis draws on social capital literature (Putnam
1993: 167; Varshney 2001; Castles 2003; C¸elik 2005b; Steele 2011) to
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emphasize the efficacy of trust, norms, and networks to facilitate and coord-
inate return actions. The community effort hypothesis also emphasizes the
role of formal associations, along with informal neighbourhood and kinship
networks, in decisions to return or stay away (Stefanovic and Loizides 2010).
If this hypothesis is correct, the displaced persons who are active in refugee
organizations, have strong trust in their families, and belong to communities
where many others have returned will be more likely to return.
Finally, the security hypothesis states that the decision to stay away because
of a fear of ethnic violence (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Walter 1999; Annan
et al. 2011) is likely associated with a sense of vulnerability (greater for
Figure 1
Hypotheses on Causes of Return of Kurdish IDPs
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women and families with small children), traumatic war-time experiences
(such as an individual’s victimization or loss of a significant other) and the
presence of ethnic others in the village (such as settlers or a military forces).
Unfortunately, as will be shown below, measurement difficulties constrained
our ability to test the security hypothesis properly.
The Kurdish Conflict: Broader Context and Alternative Narratives
Since the mid-1980s, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) has engaged in a
violent rebellion against the Turkish state, with approximately 30,000 casual-
ties (mostly ethnic Kurds).5 While ongoing, the war became less intense after
the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah O¨calan, in February 1999 (Romano
2006). Even so, an estimated 378,335 to 1.2 million people have been dis-
placed within Turkey, mostly in the major urban centres of the country
(HRW 2005; IDMC 2012a, 2012b). By July 2009, approximately 187,000
had returned to their homes (IDMC 2012a; 51), but the majority had not.
On the one hand, the low overall return level may not be surprising, as
returnees continue to face physical insecurity, limited public services and
lack of identity recognition (Ayata and Yu¨kseker 2005; C¸elik 2005b;
Kurban et al. 2006). On the other hand, despite the absence of a comprehen-
sive peace settlement in the region, the Turkish government has introduced
policies to facilitate the return process, including a law on compensation.
State commissions in each province are authorized to estimate damages to
properties and loss of income to compensate the displaced persons on the
basis of their pre-displacement revenues (Kurban et al. 2006: 33–34).
The partial de-escalation of the Kurdish conflict in the past decade pro-
vides solid grounds to study variations in the intentions and outcomes of
decisions among victims (i.e. displaced persons) themselves. Ideally, the
Kurdish experience in Turkey could inform other cases of (potential) minor-
ity return despite a political deadlock, as in Sri Lanka, South Sudan or
Colombia (see for instance, Iba´nez and Moya 2010).
Perceptions are extremely important in understanding the broader context
of such decisions in conflict-ridden communities. Essentially, Kurds and ma-
jority Turks tend to understand the war of the 1990s in very different ways.
Minority Kurds interviewed in the Southeast regions of Turkey during the
fieldwork for this project in April 2011 emphasized their aspirations for cul-
tural and political rights. Feelings of victimization were particularly strong
among the IDPs, who emphasized their desire to maintain the right of return
to their pre-1990s ancestral lands in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. As they
tell their life stories, displacement was enforced by the Turkish military, or by
local ‘village guards’ armed to contain the Kurdish PKK uprising (Wahlbeck
1999; C¸elik 2005b). In most cases, villages were burnt by the military and
evacuation of civilians happened overnight, leading to the destruction of an-
cestral communities. Unlike internal migrants in the rest of the country,
Kurds were forced to leave their homes against their wishes (Kurban et al.
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2006). Forced displacement was not implemented simply in response to the
PKK rebellion in the 1990s but has been a feature of well-documented as-
similationist policies since the creation of modern Turkey (van Bruinessen
1999; Wahlbeck 1999; Harff and Gurr 2004: 27–43; Hassanpour and
Mojab 2005).
In contrast, Turkish public opinion has generally framed the conflict as one
between the legitimate state and the PKK terrorists. For the most part,
popular discourse emphasizes the casualties from this struggle while under-
playing the crimes committed by the military and the violent nature of forced
migration from the Kurdish regions of Turkey. In this framing, displaced
Kurds in Western Turkey are perceived as internal migrants, often unwel-
come, especially if associated with the PKK. At the political level, successive
governments have attempted to ‘depoliticize’ Kurdish ethnonationalism and
address it as a problem to be solved by regional economic development
(Yeg˘en 1999; Somer 2005). The difference in interpretation is also illustrated
numerically: government institutions initially claimed about 300,000 displaced
persons, while Kurdish NGOs cite up to three million (Ayata and Yu¨kseker
2005).
Turkish public opinion remains divided on how to handle the Kurdish
issue; on the one hand, polls show that the Turkish public sees the PKK
insurgency as the most serious problem for the country, while on the other,
the majority of the population seems to be increasingly in favour of the peace
process announced by the government in December 2012 (Caha 2013). As
demonstrated elsewhere, in a highly politicized environment, surveys are ex-
tremely important in challenging conventional beliefs (Kolossov and
O’Loughlin 2011). For instance, the 2006 Haceteppe University survey of
IDPs in Turkey represented a turning point in the government’s response
to displacement by addressing the issue of numbers of the displaced.
Commissioned by the government as a response to international pressure,
the attempt was originally criticized as ‘likely to produce another underesti-
mate’ of these numbers (Human Rights Watch 2005: 20). Yet the Haceteppe
survey has nonetheless clarified the numbers of the displaced and noted some
major gaps in public policy, for instance, the lack of awareness among the
displaced of the available channels for state compensation (Hacettepe
U¨niversitesi Nu¨fus Etu¨tleri Enstitu¨su¨ 2006).6
As for Kurdish public opinion itself, most scholars suggest the PKK upris-
ing has contributed to a strong awareness of a distinct ethnic identity (Van
Bruinessen 1994, 1998; McDowall 1997; Romano 2006). Admittedly, it is
hard to estimate the political orientation of the Kurdish populations given
the level of repression. Roughly speaking, minority Kurds tend to be divided
between those voting for ethnic Kurdish parties and those opting for main-
stream Turkish parties that appear more accommodating of their rights and
identity. In the 1990s, moderate Kurds voted for leftist parties but since then,
the left in Turkey has generally failed to gain a significant vote in the pre-
dominantly Kurdish regions. In the past decade, roughly 40 per cent of the
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voters in these regions supported the pro-Islamic Justice and Development
Party (AKP) of PM Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an (Gu¨zeldere 2009). Despite the
diversity in responses, Kurdish elites, even those supporting AKP, have
insisted on the necessity of recognizing and accommodating Kurdish minority
rights. In other words, the future support of the Kurdish voters for the ruling
party in Turkey is largely conditional on minority rights and the successful
conclusion of the long-delayed peace process (Gunter 2013; Hooper 2013).
Survey Data and Methods
The data used in our analysis were collected in a survey conducted in Turkey
from October to December 2012.7 We include data on both currently displaced
people and returnees, and we focus on three metropolitan areas in Turkey with
high concentrations of displaced: Istanbul (60 respondents), Adana-Mersin (60),
and Diyarbakir (60).
Diyarbakir is the largest Kurdish-inhabited city and unofficial capital of the
region; Istanbul has received the largest numbers of displaced (IDMC 2012a;
Kurban et al. 2006); and the Adana-Mersin metropolitan area is predominantly
Turkish inhabited but in close proximity toKurdish areas.8 Apart from Istanbul,
Adana and Mersin are the only traditionally non-Kurdish provinces with an
Figure 2
Internal Displacement in Turkey (IDMC Map)
Source: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/2997A
AFC50626566C12571800053D66B/$file/Displacement-Turkey-green-s.jpg
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elected Member of Parliament hailing from the minority Kurdish party (BDP-
Peace andDemocracy Party), an indicator of the high concentration of displaced
Kurds.9
In Turkey, there is no formal recognition or registration of members of the
Kurdish minority; therefore, we had to use independent reports on the
distribution of forced migration (Kurban et al. 2006; IDMC 2012a). The
survey agency pre-selected the neighbourhoods with a higher concentration
of displaced Kurdish persons. Within each neighbourhood, households were
randomly selected. The questionnaire consisted of questions divided into spe-
cific sections on pre-conflict experience, conditions leading to forced migra-
tion and experience in exile. It also asked about return intentions among
those still in displacement and return experience among returnees, as well
as general political attitudes (for a summary of key questions see Table 1).
In addition to the 180 currently displaced, we located and interviewed 189
Kurdish returnees in the southeast part of Turkey. Because of significant
security concerns, returnees were chosen in villages where the general situ-
ation was deemed acceptable.10
All interviews, both with the displaced and the returnees, were conducted
face to face in respondents’ homes. The respondents could choose to have
interviews conducted in Turkish or Kurdish. The data collection procedure
ensured their informed consent. The response rate was 40 per cent. Data
analysis was done using SPSS 20.0.11
Findings
Social Structure and Economic Integration
After exploring the bi-variate effect of several structural variables, we find an
overwhelming majority of returnees (78.8 per cent) work in agriculture
(among the currently displaced, only 6.6 per cent do so). A significant ma-
jority of returnees (77.2 per cent) agreed they ‘had to return because they
were too poor in displacement’. These findings support the thesis that failed
economic integration into an urban economy is associated with return. Our
findings also indicate returnees are more likely to suffer economic deprivation
than non-returnees. While 46 per cent of the returnees reported difficulties in
accessing good health care, only one per cent of the displaced had the same
concern. Presumably, this variation reflects the differences in the quality of
health care services in urban Turkey and remote rural areas in the southeast
where the Kurds are returning.
The first model in Table 2 looks at the impact of structural factors on the
odds of return. Net of other factors, older people are more likely to return
than younger ones: the average age of returnees is 49 and the average age of
displaced persons is 43. The permanently employed are about three times
more likely to stay displaced than to return, net of other factors in the
model. Those receiving state compensation for their lost property are about
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2.7 times more likely to be returnees than to remain displaced. As the extent
of compensation is estimated by the various committees on the basis of pre-
vious ownership and loss of income, this is an intuitive finding in the sense
that people with more to regain are also more capable of supporting their
Table 1
Variable Descriptions and Expected Effects
Variable Description Expected Association with the
Return
Dependent Variable
Return Whether the respondent has re-
turned to the pre-displacement
location.
Structural Variables
Gender Self-reported Men more likely to return, due to
security concerns.
Age Self-reported Older respondents more likely to
return.
Education Self-reported Better educated less likely to return.
Permanent
employment
Self-reported Permanently employed less likely to
return.
State compensation Self-reported Those who received state compensa-
tion are more likely to return.
Knowledge of
Turkish
Self-reported Respondents with good knowledge
of Turkish less likely to return.
Sense of Home Variables
Memories of home ‘How would you describe your
memories direct or indirect, from
your life in your original home,
before the displacement?’*
Respondents with strong and posi-





‘Overall, how would you describe
relations of members of your
[ethnic] group with schools in
your region before the conflict?’
Good pre-conflict relations with
schools increase the likelihood of
return.
Social Capital
Community returns ‘Following displacement did mem-
bers of your village return back to
their homes?’ very few/less than
half/about half/more than half/
almost the whole
High level of community return in-




‘How did the conflict change your
fellow villagers’ view of others?
People trust their families as
before’ (1-less 2-same, 3-more)
High level of trust in family
increases the likelihood of return.
Source: 2013 Kurdish returns data set.
*Options were 1. ‘Strong: I have strong and vivid memories of life at my original home.’
2. ‘Moderate: I have fragmented memories of my life there but they seem very far away now.’
3. ‘Indirect: I was not born or too young, but my parents have spoken to me extensively about
life at our original home.’
4. ‘Vague: I only have vague memories of my childhood and from my parents.’
5. ‘No strong memories, direct or indirect.’
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return (i.e. rebuilding their houses and starting to reuse the land). Yet it is
important to note that compensation is not conditional on return; individuals
are able to spend their compensation as they wish, either in the old or new
residencies.12
Table 2
Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression of Return, Kurds in Turkey 2012
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Structure and Integration
Age 1.021* 1.012 1.018
(.008) (.010) (.015)
Gender 1.651y 2.666** 2.546*
(.275) (.338) (.451)
Education 1.457 1.741 2.678*
(.290) (.103) (.476)
Permanent employment .291*** .325** .821
(.324) (.370) (.507)
State compensation 2.738*** 2.964*** 1.732
(.244) (.287) (.412)
Knowledge of Turkish .517*** .490*** .416***
(.135) (.160) (.244)
Sense of Home









Improved trust in family .473y
(.398)
Constant 1.950 .046** .041y
(.578) (1.128) (1.711)
Cox & Snell R2 20.7 % 30.7% 54.2%
Number of respondents 370 320 309
Significance: NS¼ not significant, yp5.10, *p5.05, **p5.01, *** p5.001.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Gender was coded as 0¼ female and 1¼male.
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Knowledge of the Turkish language is another strong and statistically
significant predictor. Each unit increase in (self-assessed) knowledge of
Turkish cuts the probability of return by half.13 Finally, while men and the
better educated are more likely to return than women and the poorly edu-
cated, education and gender are not statistically significant predictors in this
model. Pseudo R-square indicates a weak model fit. The model correctly
predicts the dependent variable in only 68 per cent of cases, low for a
binary outcome variable.
Sense of Home
The second model in Table 2 includes both structural variables and memories
of pre-displacement life. Respondents reporting good pre-displacement rela-
tions with local school authorities are more than five times more likely to
return than those without good relations with school authorities, net of other
factors. While respondents with happy memories are more than three times
more likely to return than those without such memories, this relationship is
only statistically significant at the 90 per cent level. Once sense of home
variables are inserted in this model, age is not statistically significant. This
finding is not surprising, as older people are more likely to have strong
memories of pre-conflict life.14
In this model, gender is a statistically significant predictor. Men are more
than 2.5 times more likely to return than women, net of other factors. The
impact of other predictors changes very little compared to the first model.
Pseudo R-square indicates a slightly improved model fit. This model correctly
predicts the outcome variable in 76 per cent of cases.
Social Capital
The third model adds two social capital variables: extent of community
return and level of trust in family now, compared to pre-conflict levels.
Community return is very strongly associated with individual return, with
one unit increase in the extent of the community return raising the odds of
individual return eight times.15 Contrary to our expectations, increased trust
in family reduces the odds the individual will return, approximately by half.
As before, men and the better educated are more likely to return than
women and the poorly educated, but in this model, both gender and educa-
tion are statistically significant. As in the previous two models, knowledge of
Turkish strongly reduces the odds of return. Good pre-conflict relations in
schools are still statistically significant and increase the chances of return, but
the impact of this variable is reduced. Permanent employment and state com-
pensation have the same general association as before, but they are not stat-
istically significant in this model. Pseudo-R square now indicates a strong
model fit. This model correctly predicts who will return in 92 per cent of
cases.16
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Discussion: The Way Home
By and large, the findings support the integration hypothesis. We find that the
displaced who have developed a good knowledge of the Turkish language and
obtained permanent employment are less likely to return. Most assuredly,
assimilation in the language of the dominant group has multiple normative
underpinnings, as displaced persons, particularly those in the younger gener-
ation, lose part of their culture (Bas er and C¸elik 2014). However, as the Irish,
Basque and other cases from the region suggest, linguistic assimilation does
not necessarily lead to loss of national identity (Connor 1972; McGarry and
O’Leary 1993; Ig˘s|z 2006). At the same time, memories of pre-displacement
homes, especially positive memories of educational experiences, considerably
increase the chances of return. In fact, contrary to our expectations, better
educated IDPs seem more likely to return. Arguably, those with at least some
formal education received it before their displacement, during their formative
years, and this has strengthened their attachment to the pre-displacement
residence. Alternatively, those with better education might have a stronger
sense of national identity, as suggested by Lange (2012), linked to a stronger
desire to return home. As the results on education are counter-intuitive, more
research may be needed across other cases to discover why longer years of
education considerably increase the chances of return.17
This article also finds considerable support for the sense of home hypoth-
esis. In line with the findings of several other researchers (Hammond 1999;
Jansen 2009; Loizos 2009), we find older respondents significantly more likely
to return than younger ones. In his review of anthropological literature on
return migration, Gmelch (1980: 145) argues that migrants usually connect a
sense of home to the place where they spent their formative years, in other
words, their school years. Our qualitative interviews indicate that some tea-
chers in the region might have been open to expressions of Kurdish identity,
thus adding to positive formative experiences and helping to explain this
stronger attachment.18
Furthermore, we find clear support for the community effort hypothesis,
with one unit increase in the extent of the community return raising the
odds of an individual’s return eight times, net of other factors. Related quali-
tative studies in Turkey (C¸elik 2005b) as well as Ukraine (Nikolko and
Carment 2010) have also pointed to the role of community effort, yet this
article is one of the first quantitative studies to demonstrate the role of social
capital in the process of voluntary return. More specifically, returnees
strongly agree that they were encouraged to return because others from
their village or neighbourhood also returned.
While these findings support the community effort hypothesis, several
issues remain to be clarified. The existing evidence cannot tell us exactly
how the causal mechanism works. As the vast majority of returnees and
displaced say they have never heard of any formal organizations of the
displaced, the formal NGOs do not seem to play a major role in this
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process.19 Informal coordination with neighbours appears to be much more
significant. Arguably, the presence of many other returnees may help by
recreating the pre-displacement social environment and sense of home. In
addition, community return might trigger a sense of security, even in danger-
ous areas, due to the perception of safety in numbers.
Moreover, findings on the role of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and other court decisions on compensations have direct implications
for the study of forced migration. Displaced persons are more likely to return
(or contemplate return) if courts recognize their property rights and provide
them with legal remedy and compensation. However, even within the same
cases, there have been differential decisions on displaced persons and their
rights (Paraskeva 2008; Rumelili et al. 2011), suggesting the limitations of
legal mechanisms in supporting displaced persons or affecting return outcomes.
We cannot dismiss the possibility that a high level of returns in some
neighbourhoods or villages is the result of higher levels of security in these
areas (fewer guerrilla activities or state counter-insurgency operations, for
example). Since we only have cross sectional data, we cannot tell whether
improved local security leads to higher returns (as many people want to
return to safe areas) or if high returns lead to an improved sense of security
(as the sense of safety in numbers reduces fears of new violence). This
dilemma could be resolved by local qualitative studies of the organization
of returns and the processes of cooperation among neighbours in small
geographic areas.
Lack of variables to measure the security concerns of the displaced and
returnees correctly is the most significant limitation of our models.
Nonetheless, perception of security is clearly a key factor in the return
process. For example, when asked about the factors inhibiting their return,
the displaced rank ‘I would be worried about my safety’ at 9.06 out of 10 and
‘I would be worried about the safety of my family’ at 9.23 out of 10.20
Similarly, when asked about the factors that could persuade others to
return, returnees rank ‘improvements in security situation’ at 9.66 out of
10.21 As expected, security concerns top the list for both returnees and
non-returnees. However, as the measurements indicate nearly universal ex-
treme security concerns, there is so little variation in the security variable that
it cannot be used as a predictor in multivariate models.
Conclusion: Your Children Aren’t Coming but Your School Friends Might
While many scholars have focused on ethnic cleansing (e.g. McGarry 1998;
Carmichael 2002; Mann 2005), only a handful of academic studies have
examined voluntary return (Vasileva 1992; Koinova 1999; Dahlman and O´
Tuathail 2005; Iba´nez and Moya 2010; Toal and Grono 2011). And among
these, the general assumption is that forced migrations and displacements are
irreversible once new demographic facts are established on the ground (e.g.,
Kaufmann 1996) with few scholars emphasizing successful cases of return
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(Dahlman and O´ Tuathail 2005; Belloni 2008). Displacement and forced
migration remain difficult challenges in many parts of the world. Millions
of internally displaced, from Rwanda to Sri Lanka and Colombia, as well as
generations of Palestinians across the Middle East remain in limbo, uncertain
whether to opt for integration into a new environment (when permitted by
the authorities) or wait for an opportunity to return to their ancestral lands
(Iba´nez and Moya 2010; Haklai 2011; McDoom 2011). Meanwhile, the 2014
World Refugee Day was marked by another unfortunate record: global
forced displacement topped 50 million for the first time since the period
after the Second World War, driven mainly by wars across Turkey’s borders
in Syria and Iraq as well as Central Africa (UNHCR 2014a). As forced
migration assumes unprecedented levels, giving a voice to those affected
most by conflict is a necessary step in shaping future humanitarian missions.
This article challenges the common assumption, particularly among aca-
demics in the field, that displacement is irreversible (Zetter 1999; Adelman
and Barkan 2011) by investigating Kurdish returns in Turkey. It highlights
the importance of analysing the intentions of IDPs themselves, and it formu-
lates and tests a set of hypotheses emphasizing the role of structural, inte-
gration, identity, and community variables in the return process.
Public policies seeking to reverse forced migration seldom consult the
actual victims of displacement, but this should be a key consideration, espe-
cially in countries with problems in minority representation, such as Turkey
(Yanik 2011; Aktu¨rk 2012). Both policymakers and scholars have yet to take
advantage of theoretically-informed survey findings on the needs of displaced
persons (Ergil 2000; Ekmekci 2011; Levitt and Ciplak 2012). Despite their
own limitations, surveys could provide important insights in channelling the
appropriate resources for potential returnees. As the majority of the early
returnees are likely to be older, the provision of good health care services
might be a crucial support to early returnees. In particular, findings on the
demographic and age profile of returnees could influence relative preferences
and funding priorities for schools (for younger parents with children) or
hospitals (for the elderly).
A notable finding of this article is the role of social capital as expressed in
family and community ties. The importance of displaced persons’ associations
suggests the validity of the community effort hypothesis as an explanation of
the decision to return or stay away. But our findings also suggest that social
capital needs to be disaggregated to determine its effects. Contrary to our
expectations, the most beneficial work in coordinated refugee returns seems
to be done not by formal and permanent refugee NGOs, but by informal
associations of neighbours. Community return strongly improves the chances
of individual return, while increased trust in family makes return less likely.
Finally, findings point to a potential inter-generational conflict in the family
with regard to return, with the older generation wanting the family to return
to the old ‘home’ and the younger generation seeing the current residence as
the new one.
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A number of scholars (Malkki 1995: 509; Jansen and Lofving 2009: 14;
Koser and Black 1999: 3, 9) emphasize the need to acknowledge a multiplicity
of refugee experiences, without assuming that all refugees necessarily see their
pre-displacement place of origin as ‘home’, to which they want to return. The
desire to help refugees to exercise their right to return should not cause us to
turn that right into an obligation and voluntary returns into forced move-
ment. Instead, researchers and policy makers should allow those who have
suffered forced migration to choose whether they want to return and, if so,
under what circumstances. The difficult but successful returns of the Kurds in
Turkey can help us understand which refugees are most likely to want to
return and what can be done to help them succeed.
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1. UNHCR describes voluntary repatriation as the ‘solution of choice for the largest
number of refugees’ and highlights that ‘for millions of refugees around the world,
going home remains the strongest hope of finding an end to exile’ UNHCR
(2014b). The United Nations’ Pinheiro Principles also stipulate that ‘all refugees
and displaced persons have the right to have restored to them any housing, land
and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be
compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually impossible to
restore as determined by independent, impartial tribunal’ (United Nations
Economic and Social Council 2005).
2. UNHCR (2013) defines protracted displacements as those involving 25,000 or
more refugees for more than five years.
3. Adelman and Barkan (2011) are probably the strongest proponents of the ‘irrever-
sibility thesis’ we challenge in this article. They emphatically argue that ‘the ideol-
ogy and commitment to return conveys the notion of repatriation as a distant,
impractical solution in the face of real desperation’ (2011: xvii).
4. For a discussion and critique of the ‘hierarchy’ across various durable solutions to
displacement see Chimni (2004) and Souter (2014).
5. Although a figure of 30,000 deaths prevailed in both Turkish and international
media, there is some ambiguity about exact numbers, ethnic origin, and political
proclivity (PKK or Turkish state) of the casualties in this war; see Human Rights
Watch (1995); Turkish Parliament Debates 27 June 1995; Kiris c¸i and Winrow
(1997).
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6. Much of the subsequent criticism focused not on its findings per se but on the
lack of transparency. For instance, Kurban (2013: 349) argues that neither
‘Hacettepe University nor the Government has released the findings of the quali-
tative component of this research’. For other criticism, see Kurban et al. (2006:
17–20).
7. The Optimist Research and Support Services which conducted this survey is a
regular member of the Turkish Research Association. Previous academic clients
include Essex University (UK), Tilburg University (Netherlands), and
Bogazici University (Turkey). See optimistresearch.com (accessed 14 November
2013).
8. Unlike many other societies, the forced migration of Kurds in Turkey did not
separate demographically rival communities into distinct territories (see Brubaker
1995; Belloni 2006; Bieber 2006; O’Leary 2007). On the contrary, displacement was
part of the migration and urbanization movements of recent decades, leading to
more ‘ethnic mixing’ as displaced Kurds found refuge in cities with almost exclu-
sively ethnic Turkish populations.
9. See a list of elected MPs in the 24th period of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.liste (ac-
cessed 14 November 2013).
10. To understand our data collection approach and put the survey findings in
context, it is necessary to take into account the political sensitivities of the
Kurdish issue in Turkey. In the past decade, the Turkish government and leaders
of the ethnic Kurdish community have taken a series of steps aimed at perman-
ently ending the violent conflict and improving the integration of the Kurdish
minority in Turkey. At the same time, memories of the recent armed struggle and
state counter-insurgency are fresh in many people’s minds; this heightens their
safety concerns and influences their readiness to discuss the war years.
Consequently, to reflect the concerns on the ground and to make data collection
possible, we had to make a series of adjustments in our methods. For general
security reasons, it was necessary to remove from the questionnaire some of
the questions dealing with memories of war and inter-ethnic relations in Turkey.
11. As discussed below, the removal of some of the security-related variables reduced
our ability to control for the impact of security concerns in multivariate analysis.
Still, there was little variation in related questions, as almost everyone in the
sample expressed concerns about security. Security was also reported to us as a
major consideration in our interviews with political leaders, NGOs, and other
experts working with the displaced in Turkey (interviews in Istanbul, Ankara,
and Diyarbakir in June 2011 and April 2012).
12. These changes in government policies reflected the rulings of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) which recommended the introduction of effective
domestic remedies within Turkey before IDPs could apply directly to the Court
(Rumelili et al. 2011). Such decisions were not only common to Turkey with
regards to the Kurds but also Cyprus (Paraskeva 2008) and the former
Yugoslavia (Palko 2012). For a detailed account of the compensation law in
Turkey, see Kurban et al. (2006: 33–34).
13. Among the respondents reporting ‘extremely poor’ level of fluency in Turkish,
81.2 per cent are returnees and 18.2 per cent are non-returnees. Conversely,
among the respondents reporting ‘very good’ level of fluency in Turkish only
13.5 per cent are returnees and 86.5 per cent are non-returnees.
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14. The average age of respondents reporting ‘vague, indirect, or no memories’ of
their pre-conflict home is 33 years; the average age of respondents reporting
‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ memories is 49 years.
15. When asked about the factors which encourage them to return home, returnees
rank ‘other displaced persons from my village/neighbourhood returned’ at 8.03
out of 10.
16. We tested whether membership in formal refugee associations raises the odds of
return. However, the vast majority of respondents (more than 99 per cent of both
returnees and non-returnees) are not aware that any such organizations even exist.
Thus, we find no support for the argument that formal refugee associations create
social capital that facilitates return.
17. Qualitative studies have also indicated the problem of education among the
Kurds. For instance, in their interviews with Kurdish youth Bas er and C¸elik
(2014) note that ‘not only is the quality of schools in the region substandard,
but many children do not remain in school, especially after completing primary
school, either because their families cannot afford the education-related expenses
or because they have to work in order to contribute to the family income.’
18. Authors’ interviews in Istanbul, Ankara, and Diyarbakir in June 2011 and April
2012.
19. While this finding might reflect genuine lack of knowledge, it might also be
influenced by respondents’ safety concerns.
20. The scale of importance ranges from 1 to 10, with higher numbers meaning
greater importance. We are reporting average scores for all displaced.
21. More specifically, 75.7 per cent of returnees assigned a ranking of 10/10 to the
importance of security improvements for others to return.
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